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  1 
1. Introduction 
 
Different countries adopt quite different decentralised governance structures with 
varying degrees of decentralisation and local electoral control (Ter-Minassian, 1997). A 
good, though atypical, example is the asymmetrical spatial configuration thrown up by 
the UK Government’s “New Localism” agenda. The English regions have been given 
delegated authority but have rejected the elected assemblies that would have put this 
authority under regional democratic control. However, the other countries of the United 
Kingdom - Northern Ireland (in principle), Scotland and Wales - have been given varying 
devolved powers. The position of London is different again. Further, in some cases these 
powers have been imposed from the centre, in other cases they have been adopted as the 
result of local referenda.
1  
 
These differences in administrative and constitutional mechanisms come about, at 
least partly, by historical accident and as a result of wider political factors. However, in 
this paper we focus on the more narrowly defined efficiency implications of such 
arrangements. This is useful for identifying the motives that might underlie particular 
administrative set ups and the possible efficiency losses associated with specific forms of 
decentralisation or devolution. In particular, we develop a framework that allows a 
comparison of the effectiveness of implementing policy through three alternative 
systems. These are: a centralised; a decentralised; and a fully devolved structure. In this 
analysis we build on the work of Canes-Wrone et al, (2001) and Maskin and Tirole 
(2004) on representative democracy. The novelty is that we place this analysis in the 
context of a potentially decentralised or devolved regional administration.  
 
The paper is structured in the following way. In Section 2 we position the present 
paper in the existing literature. In Section 3 we explain our own approach in broad 
outline. In Sections 4, 5 and 6 we give more detail about the way in which we 
conceptualise decision taking in centralised, decentralised and fully devolved systems. 
                                                           
1 Appendix 1 gives more detail on these decentralised and devolved powers for the UK. 
  2The analysis focuses on the interaction between exogenous quality variation in officials, 
private information and local democratic procedures. Section 7 uses computation to 
identify the parameter domains within which each of the organisational forms is the most 
efficient. Section 8 gives comments and a conclusion. 
 
2 Previous  literature 
 
The efficiency of different institutional forms of governance receives limited 
treatment in the standard economic texts. Whilst the existence of government is taken as 
a starting point for most economic policy debates, the internal operation - and efficiency - 
of government itself is of rather less concern. However, in principle three strands of the 
economics literature are relevant to the present paper. These deal with: the geographic 
extent of the national governments; the spatial distribution of decentralised government 
arrangements within the national territory; and the public choice literature, incorporating 
the associated political economy approach to the nature of incentives within government. 
 
There is a nascent economics literature that attempts to explain the size of nations 
using a broad economic efficiency approach (Alesina and Spolaore, 2005). This literature 
takes the optimal size of a nation as a trade-off between economies of scale in the 
production of public goods and the physical and cultural “distance” felt by peripheral 
regions from the centre, where the supply of these public goods is concentrated. With a 
single national tax structure, the benefits from a unified country are distributed in a 
regionally differentiated way, with some territories having a possible incentive to secede. 
However, while secession may improve welfare in the seceding region, it will have a 
detrimental impact on total welfare. Two solutions are suggested to deal with this 
problem. First, providing that transfers do not lead to significant distortions, it might be 
optimal to make fiscal transfers from better- to poorer-provided areas. Second, public 
good provision might be decentralised. Whilst we are well aware of the issues raised by 
regional heterogeneity in this approach (Christie and Swales, 2005), it is a topic ignored 
in the present paper. 
 
  3There is a much more extensive literature on the distribution of government 
functions within national boundaries from the perspective of the optimal provision of 
“local” public goods. Tiebout’s (1956) influential paper on locational decisions 
represented a major step in the analysis of labour mobility determined by public good 
provision rather than explicit labour market conditions. Subsequent work by Musgrave 
(1959) and Oates (1972, 1999) has determined much of the lexicon on federalism and 
shaped the arguments that have surrounded it since. However, in this paper we are not 
concerned with the type of public good to be provided at the local level: we assume that 
this has been decided already. Rather we focus more on the most efficient way that these 
local public goods can be provided. In comparing decentralised, rather than national, 
decision making on the provision of local public goods we touch on the fiscal federalist 
approach, but this is not a central concern of the paper. 
 
Finally, there is an extensive literature on public choice theory (Mueller, 2003), 
flowing from the seminal work of authors such as Arrow (1951), Bergson (1938) and 
Downes (1957). This body of work analyses how different national public choices can be 
made, particularly in a democratic setting. A key aspect of our paper is the impact of 
introducing an elected, rather than appointed, regional official. We therefore engage with 
this literature, though the issues are transposed to the regional level. Also we concentrate 
here on a limited set of problems that a democratic arrangement can generate. We are 





Our analysis identifies the problem of administering the provision of local public 
goods as a choice between three options. The first is centralised (national) decision 
taking by a national official. This centrally made choice might be inappropriately 
adjusted to local conditions – the standard fiscal federalist problem. The second is 
decentralised (regional) decision taking delegated to an unelected local official whose 
expected quality is lower than that of the national official. Here there is a trade-off 
  4between the quality and specificity of decision applied at the local level. The third is local 
democratic (devolved) decision taking where the local official is chosen through a system 
of representative democracy. In this case we focus particularly on the possible benefits of 
improved selection as against the potential cost of an incumbent pandering to the 
electorate. Pandering involves the official’s adopting inefficient policies in order to 
improve the chances of re-election.   
 
For pedagogic purposes we use an extremely simplified model framework. The 
nation has n identically sized regions. For each region, there are two possible states, A or 
B, which we refer to as the region’s type, two available policies, labelled α and β. In each 
time period, each region’s type is chosen independently from a prior probability 
distribution. There is a probability pA for type A and pB (= 1 – pA) for type B. However, 
A is the most likely type so that 1 ≥ pA ≥ ½ ≥ pB ≥ 0. The value of pA is a measure of 
inter-regional heterogeneity. The lower the value of pA, within the relevant range, the 
greater the degree of heterogeneity. Where it is relevant, we assume that the value of pA 
is common knowledge.  
 
3.1 The citizen (voter) 
 
All citizens have identical tastes and endowments. Therefore whilst external 
conditions vary spatially - so that optimal policy can differ between regions - there is no 
intra-regional variation across citizens so that the regional population can be represented 
by an individual citizen and, where appropriate, the regional electorate by an individual 
voter. When the (Greek) policy decision coincides with the (Roman) region’s type, so 
that, for example, policy α is applied to region type A, the pay-off to the regional 
population - and, where relevant, the regional electorate - is 1. Where the region and 
policy type fail to coincide, so that policy β is applied to region type A, for example, the 
pay-off to the regional population is 0.
2 We distinguish the regional citizen/voter as male 
                                                           
2 An example from regional development could be that there are two policy options: encouraging new firm 
formation (α) and attracting foreign direct investment (β). These policies might be optimal in regions 
dominated by small (A) and large (B) plants respectively. 
  5and the regional population’s expected pay-off is shown as E(Π) with the subscript V (for 
voter). 
 
3.2 The official 
 
An individual official, identified for heuristic purposes as female, takes the 
relevant policy decisions. The official can be of high (H) or low (L) quality, with the 
corresponding prior probabilities, pH and pL (= 1–pH), with 1 ≥ pH ≥ 0. Where relevant, 
we always take the probability pH to be common knowledge, though the quality of any 
particular official is private information. The expected payoff for the official is identified 
as E(Π), with the subscript O (for official). 
 
We assume that the only motivation for the official, whether appointed or elected, 
is to leave a legacy – a valuable policy that she implemented and is therefore associated 
with her. We therefore assume that, as with the citizen, the official receives a pay-off of 
unity when the policy and region type match and zero when they do not. In particular, the 
official is assumed to get no benefit from being in office per se. However, her motives 
are not truly altruistic – if that were the case, low quality officials would not seek office. 
 
Under the national and regional administrations, the official is simply appointed. 
Under the devolved organisation, the official is initially appointed and can remain in 
office for two time periods. However, there is an election between these two periods. If 
the election removes the incumbent, the new official only serves for one period. 
 
3.3 The official’s quality 
 
At the beginning of each time period, the official gets a signal that indicates the 
region’s type. For a high quality official, this signal is always correct. However, for a low 
quality official, the signal includes a degree of error. We want this error to have two key 
characteristics. First, the signal should still be informative, so that in any single time 
period the official receives her maximum expected pay-off through following the signal. 
  6Second, for the low quality official, the signal less effectively distinguishes between 
states A and B.  
 
  A convenient set of conditions that generates these characteristics is the 
following. If the low quality official gets a signal A, the signal is always correct. 
However, a signal of B to a low quality official is only correct with a probability qL, 
which lies between ½ and 1. The low quality official therefore maximises her one-period 
expected return by always matching her policy to the signal. If the signal is A, then the 
return from adopting policy α is 1. If the signal is B, adopting policy β gives a greater 
expected return than adopting policy α: qL  ≥ ½ ≥ 1-qL. Therefore our suggested 
formulation provides information for the low quality local official that is increasing in qL 
and pA. 
 
To verify our second desired condition, we determine the distribution of the signal 












where psX,Y is the probability that the signal is of type X, conditional upon the official 
being of type Y. Given that 1 ≥ q L ≥ 0 expression (1), together with the fact that the 
relevant probabilities sum to unity, implies that:. 
 
(2)  ,, 11 BL AL B A psp s p p = −≥ = −  
 
Rearranging equation (2) gives: 
  
(3)  , A LA psp ≤  
 
  7For the low quality official, the signal therefore distinguishes less effectively between 
states A and B. It under-predicts the most likely state of the region and over-predicts the 
less likely state.  
 
Before progressing it will be useful to identify two further sets of relationships 
implied by the assumptions made about the accuracy of the signal to the low quality 
official.
3 The first is that under these circumstances the unconditional probability that a 
signal is B is greater than the actual probability that the region is of type B. This is 
reversed for signal and regional type A, so that: 
 
(4) ; BBAA psp p sp ≥≤  .  
 
where psX is the unconditional probability that the signal is of type X. The intuition here 
is that a high quality official always receives the correct signal whilst a low quality 
officials receives a disproportionately large number of B signals. Therefore, overall, the 
probability of a B signal is greater than the probability of a B regional type. 
 
A second set of result flowing from these assumptions is that the probability that 
the official is of low quality, conditional on her receiving a B signal, is greater than the 
unconditional probability that the official is of low quality. Again a set of corresponding 
relationships hold for the officials of high quality and those receiving an A signal: 
 
(5)  ,, ; LB L HB H pop p op ≥≤  
 
(6)  ,, ; LA L HA H pop p op ≤ ≥  
 
where poX,Y  is the probability that the official is of type X, conditional on her receiving a 
signal Y. Expressions (5) and (6) reflect the fact that an official receiving an A signal is 
                                                           
3 These relationships are formally verified in Appendix 2. 
  8disproportionately likely to be of high quality, and one receiving a B signal to be of low 
quality.  
 
3.4 The policy decision 
 
When policy is decided at the national level, identified with a superscript N, we 
assume that the national official is of high quality, so that pH = 1. In this context, this 
implies that the official always chooses the policy that is optimal for the nation as a 
whole, though this might be sub-optimal for an individual region. For a region, the 
expected utility from national decision taking is a function of the number of regions and 
the probability distribution between the different regional types: 
 
(7)    ( ) ( , )
NN
VV A Ep Π= Π n
L q
                                                          
 
When policy is decentralised to the region, which we identify using the 
superscript R, the decision is taken by an appointed local (regional) official.
4 This 
regional official is of a lower expected quality than the national official, so that in this 
case 1 > pH ≥ 0. Given the discussion in Section 3.3, the implications for the efficiency of 
the low quality official’s decision making depends on the prior probability of the region’s 
type, pA, and the parameter, qL, that measures the signal’s quality. Therefore the expected 
utility from decentralised regional decision making depends on the values of pA, pH, and 
qL.  
 
(8)    ( ) ( , , )
RR
VV A H Ep p Π= Π
 
The distinction between delegated decentralisation and devolution is the presence 
of a democratic procedure at the regional level. In particular, it becomes possible for the 
local official to be removed via an election. We assume a rational, forward-looking 
electorate, so that removal will occur where the expected quality of a possible 
 
4 We use the terms “local” and “regional” interchangeably, simply to fight repetition. 
  9replacement official is greater than that of the incumbent. Although in principle this 
process improves the effectiveness of local decision taking, it can have perverse effects. 
In particular, under certain circumstances a low quality official with an incentive to stay 
in office will pander to the local electorate. This means that in an attempt to secure re-
election, she chooses a policy that she knows to be popular but believes to be wrong. 
Taking into account such effects, we show that the expected utility from devolved 
decision taking, identified using a D superscript, is a function also of the official’s time 
discount factor (δ), so that
5   
 
(9) ( ) ( , , , )
DD
VV A H L Ep p q δ Π= Π  
 
The remainder of the paper focuses on the relative efficiencies of these alternative 
decision making mechanisms. In Sections 4, 5 and 6 we specify equations (7), (8) and (9) 
in greater detail. 
 
 
4.  National decision taking 
 
The national official is always of high quality. This implies that she acts in the 
national interest, which here means choosing the policy that benefits the majority of the 
regions.
6 Therefore for an individual region, the probability, pM, that its own type 
matches that of the majority of regions is crucial. In fact, given the way in which the 
model has been parameterised, this probability is also the expected payoff to the regional 
voter, E (Π
N
V ). Therefore when we have national decision taking: 
 
                                                           
5 The value of δ clearly affects the expected values of decisions taken under the national and regional 
organisational forms when these are computed over a two period time span. However, in these cases the 
undiscounted values in the two separate time period are the same, and the value of δ doesn’t influence 
these. However, in the devolved case the value of δ plays a role in determining whether the official panders 
or not and therefore affects the value of the voter’s expected pay-off in a more fundamental manner.   
6 Where there are equal numbers of regions of type A and B, the national politician chooses policy α. The 
assertion that the high quality official always acts in the interest of the electorate, even where the electorate 
is mistaken about its own interests, is discussed in greater detail in the next section.  
  10(10)    ( ) ( , )
N
VM Ep n Π= A p
 
This probability can be calculated using the following three steps. First, determine 
the probability that any one aggregate configuration of regional types will occur. By an 
aggregate configuration of regional types, we mean an outcome that would have n-k 
regions of type A and k of type B, where k is an integer, n≥ k ≥ 0. Second, multiply this 
probability by the probability that an individual region would be in the majority in such a 
configuration. Third, sum across all of the possible configurations. 
 
For step one, we use the binomial theorem to determine the probability of each 
aggregate configuration of regions. Step two is completed using the fact that for each of 







⎥ . The third step, summing all these expressions gives the expected value for 
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Figure 4.1 shows how E(Π
N
V) varies with pA for values of n equal to 5 and 10. 
 
 
5.  Decentralised government 
  
With a decentralised form of government, we assume that in each region a local 
delegated official determines policy. The underlying set up is exactly as with national 
  11decision making. The region is allocated to one of two types (A and B) from the 
probability distribution (pA, pB) and the regional official has a choice between two 
corresponding policies (α and β). The key advantage of decentralised, as against 
nationally determined, decision making is that the local official can ignore conditions in 
the rest of the country when setting policy. However, we also assume that the local 
official is of lower quality than the national official, and therefore she is more likely to 
make errors  
 
  We use a constructed variable, zY, which gives the single period expected pay-off 
to the citizen if the regional official of quality Y ( = H, L) follows her signal. This is 
calculated as: 
 
(12) 1 H z =  
(13)  ,, (1 ) LB L L B L zp s q p s = +−  
 
Substituting equation (1) into equation (13) produces: 
 
(14) 









=+ = +  
 
Because the signal is informative, with decentralised government the local official 
always follows her signal. Therefore, the expected value for the local citizen from a 
regionally decentralised decision making procedure is equal to the expected value when 
the official always follows her signal. This is identified as z, so that: 
 
(15) 
2 1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )
()
R LH L H
VH H L L A
LL
qp q pq
Ez p z p z p
qq
L − +− − −
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The expected payoff to the regional voter is positively related the prior 
probabilities that the region is of type A, that official is of high quality and that the B 
signal to the low quality official is accurate. The value of E(ΠV
R) is linear in pA and pH 
and is concave in qL. As any of the key parameters pA, pH or qL approaches unity, the 
expected value of the citizen’s pay-off approaches unity. This last result is because where 
any of these three parameters is unity, either there is zero probability of a region’s being 
in a B state, there are no low quality officials or a low quality official makes no errors.  
 
 
6.  Devolved Government 
 
To move from decentralised to devolved regional decision-making involves 
adding a democratic layer at the regional level that we characterise as local representative 
democracy.
7 Such a democratic procedure has potential beneficial impacts on both moral 
hazard and selection problems. Essentially, if the electorate can vote out an official who 
exhibits low or misdirected effort, or who has poor decision-making skills, the quality of 
local decision-making should rise. However, in a situation of asymmetric information 
between the incumbent local official and the electorate, the official might use inefficient 
actions in order to gain re-election. 
 
7 Other alternatives exist, such as direct decision making through referenda. However, local representative 
democracy is the standard regional democratic mechanism and applies to the UK devolved regions.  
  13 
For pedagogic reasons we drastically simplify the local democratic process, 
adopting a variant of the model used in Canes-Wrone et al (2001). The behaviour of the 
elected official and the regional electorate is analysed as a non-co-operative two-period 
game of incomplete information. The solution concept used is a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium. The basic set up is as under decentralised decision making: the official can 
be of either high or low quality, and whilst the corresponding probabilities, pH and pL, are 
common knowledge, the regional official’s actual quality is private information. The 
payoffs are exactly as for decentralised decision making except that as this is a two 
period game, a time-discount factor of δ, 1 ≥ δ ≥ 0, is applied to pay-offs in the second 
period. We assume that the only information that the voter has about the incumbent 
official is her choice of policy in period 1. In particular, the voter has no means of 
knowing the actual region type in period 1 in advance of voting and therefore cannot 
verify whether the official chose the optimal policy.  
 
  For a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we need to identify a set of strategies and 
beliefs that have the following characteristics. First, the strategy of the official is optimal, 
given the strategy of the voter. Second, the voter’s beliefs are consistent with the 
Bayesian updating of his priors, given the strategy of the official. Third, the strategy of 
the voter is optimal, given his beliefs. In this case, the strategy of the official consists of 
the choice of policy in periods 1 and 2, conditional on her quality and the signal that she 
receives in periods 1 and 2. For the voter, the decision is whether to retain or remove the 
incumbent official, conditional on the official’s policy choice in period 1. We show that 
the key belief concerns the probability that the official is low quality, given that she chose 
policy β in period 1, poL,β. 
 
There are two possible equilibria, depending on the value of key prior 
probabilities. These is a straightforward pure strategy, non-pandering equilibrium, where 
the official, of either quality, always follows her signal. There is also a mixed-strategy, 
pandering equilibrium where a low quality official receiving a period-1 B signal will play 
  14a mixed strategy, and therefore sometimes pander. In this case the voter also plays a 
mixed strategy when the official adopts a β policy.  
 
6.1   A non-pandering equilibrium 
 
  The non-pandering equilibrium has the following strategies and beliefs: 
 
Incumbent Official: 
Strategy:    tt PS =
 
Voter: 
Belief:   ,, ; LL LL pop p op βα ≥≤  
Strategy:  1 ,, IfP ER T e l s e ER M α == =  
 
where Pt
 is the policy of the devolved official in time period t, St is the signal received by 
the official in time period t, E is the voter’s electoral decision, and RM and RT represent 
remove and retain respectively.  
 
  In brief, in this equilibrium if the initial set of prior probabilities lie within the 
appropriate range, the official, of either high or low quality, will follow her signal in each 
time period and the voter will remove any official choosing the β policy in time period 1. 
The strategy of the voter is based on the expectation that the probability of those 
choosing policy β being low quality is greater than the prior probability pL. This 
expectation is shown to be correct, given the strategy of the official. From the voter’s 
viewpoint, this equilibrium out-performs the decentralised decision because the 
behaviour of the official in period 1 is unaffected by the impending election, whilst the 
voter’s election strategy increases the expected quality of the period-2 official. We fully 
outline the non-pandering equilibrium in Appendix 3. However, the equilibrium is 
intuitive if the official always follows her signal: the key issue concerns the set of 
parameter values for which it is optimal for the low quality official to follow her signal. 
  15 
As argued in the previous section, an official maximises her single period pay-off 
by matching her signal, so that in period 2 the residing official always matches her signal. 
However, the situation might be different in period 1, if the policy choice in that period 
affects the probability of surviving to period 2. For the high quality official this is not 
relevant; she always follows her signal in each time period. Given the voter’s strategy, if 
she receives a period-1 A signal there is no potential conflict. However, even if she 
receives a period-1 B signal, it is irrational for her to deviate in period 1, even though this 
will mean that she is certain to be removed in the election. This is because when the high 
quality official goes against her signal she knows she is pursuing the wrong policy and 
her pay-off is zero. It is irrational for her to give up a pay-off of 1 in period 1 in order to 
get a discounted payoff of δ in period 2.  
 
The circumstances are different for the low quality elected official. In period 1, 
she might pander to the electorate by following a policy that she believes to be wrong, 
but the electorate judges to be correct. This strategy might be rational if it increases her 
chance of re-election and a subsequent opportunity to leave a legacy. This is a potentially 
credible strategy because there is a chance that her period-1 signal is incorrect. There is 
therefore a chance that pandering will deliver the correct (matched) policy in period 1, 
whilst also providing the official a second opportunity in period 2. 
 
Again, where the low quality official receives a period-1 A signal, there is no 
conflict: an A signal is always correct and, given the voter’s strategy, following the A 
signal also ensures re-election. However, if the low quality elected official receives a B 
signal, then the expected values from following the signal (superscripted F) and 
pandering (superscripted P), given the strategy of the voter, are:  
 
(16)  , ()
DF
OL B L Eq Π =     
 
(17)  , () 1
DP
OL B L L Eq z δ Π= − +  
 
  16Given the voter’s strategy, for it to be rational for the low quality elected official to 
follow a period-1 B signal,  , () () ,
D FD
OL B OL B EE Π≥ Π
P
L z
. From equations (16) and (17), this 
implies that 
 
(18) 1 LL qq δ ≥− +  
 
Rearranging inequality (18) and using equation (13) generates the result that for low 
quality official to always follow her signal, a composite variable, k, which is a function of 
pA, qL and δ, must be greater than zero: 
 




















We will examine the conditions under which inequality (19) holds in more detail 
in Section 7. However, two general points are worth making here. First, the partial 
derivatives show that as the values of pA and δ rise, the value of k falls, so that ceteris 
paribus, the more likely that the official will pander. This is easily explicable in that the 
only impact of increases in either pA or δ is to raise the expected value of the elected 
official’s possible legacy in period 2. The impact of an increase in the value of qL is more 
complex. Strictly the outcome is ambiguous. An increase in qL increases the expected 
value of following the B signal in period 1, because this signal is more likely to be 
accurate. But it also increases the expected value of the official’s possibly legacy in 
period 2, both for this reason and also because it reduces the probability of a low quality 
official receiving a B signal in period 2. However, only if the value of δ were high and pA 






to be negative, so that an increase in qL reduces 
the probability of pandering.   
 
  17Second, given the strategy of the voter to replace an official who adopts a β 
policy, within the permissible range of values that individual parameter can take, there 
are combinations of values that give pandering and others that give the non-pandering as 
the optimal outcome for the elected official. For example, δ > qL is a sufficient condition 
for k to be negative, implying pandering, whilst δ = 0 is sufficient for k to be non-
negative where non-pandering is the official’s optimal response.  
 
Before considering what happens if the inequality (19) does not hold, it will prove 
useful to identify the expected pay-off to the voter in the non-pandering case: 
 
(20)  ,, ()
DF
VA H A L A L E z ps po po z ps z δ B ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ Π= + + + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ 
 
In Appendix 2 we show that: 
 
 (21)  , (1 )(1 )(1 ))
LHA
HA








Given the formula for poH,A identified in equation (21), expression (20) is clearly non-
linear in pA, pH and qL and more complex than equation (15), which gives the citizen’s 
expected value under decentralised decision making with no local democratic process. 
However, it is possible to rank the outcomes. If equation (15) is adjusted to a 2 period 
model: 
 
(22)    ,, () ()
DF R
VV H A L A L EE i f f p o p o z Π≥ Π + ≥ z
 
Using the definition of z given by equation (15), inequality (22) holds iff poH,A ≥ pH (and 
therefore also that poL,A ≤ pL). These conditions are verified in expressions (5) and (6). 
Therefore where the parameter values discourage pandering, the expected value for the 
voter from the devolved system is greater than the decentralised and delegated scheme. 
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5.2  A pandering equilibrium 
 
If inequality (19) fails to hold, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. It is no 
longer optimal for the low quality elected official to follow the first-period signal B if the 
voter’s strategy is to remove any incumbent who adopts policy β. However, the 
rationality of this voting strategy is dependent on the voter’s belief that low-quality 
officials are over-represented in the population of those who adopt policy β. But, if low 
quality officials now always pander in period 1, the opposite belief is correct. Only high 
quality officials now adopt policy β, and the rational voter should remove all officials 
who choose policy α. This would then negate the reason for pandering by the official.  
 
In these circumstances, for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium we require mixed 
strategies so that the low quality official follows a period-1 B signal, and the voter 
removes an official adopting a period-1 β policy with probabilities that lie between zero 
and one. More specifically: 
 
Incumbent Official: 
Strategy: High quality official   ,,
D
H tH t PS t = ∀  
 Low  quality  official    ,, 2:
D
Lt Lt Lt If S A or t P S == = ,
L      ,1 ,1 :P r ( )
D
LL IfS B P q β = == 
Voter: 
Belief:    ,, ; LLLL pop p op αβ ≤=  
Strategy    1 ,;
D if P E RT α ==
   1
21









== = −  
 
  The detailed validation of the mixed strategy equilibrium is given in Appendix 3. 
However, the intuition is relatively straightforward. For these prior probabilities, the 
  19optimal approach for the low quality official is to mix her strategies when receiving a 
period-1 B signal so as to produce an expected distribution of her period-1 choices 
between pure strategies α and β that exactly match that of a high quality official. Such a 
mixed strategy entails the low quality official’s choosing an α policy with a positive 
probability when she receives a period-1 B signal: that is, it involves a degree of 
pandering. The low quality official’s strategy then implies that the voter cannot improve 
the expected quality of the period-2 official through his voting strategy. 
 
For a low quality official to adopt such a mixed strategy, when she receives a 
period-1 B signal her expected value from choosing either of the pure strategies must be 
the same. This involves the voter mixing his strategy so that there is now a positive 
probability of retaining an official who chooses a period-1 β strategy.   
 
  In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the voter’s expected pay-off is given as: 
 
(23)  ,, , , , , () ( ( 1 ) ( 1 )1
DM S E
VH L B L L B L L B L B L Ep p p s p o q p o q p s ββ z δ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ Π= + + − − + − + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  
 
where the superscript MSE represents mixed strategy equilibrium and poβ,L,B is the 
probability that the official adopts policy β, conditional on her being of low quality and 
receiving a B signal. The low quality official’s strategy gives poβ,L,B and equation (2) the 
value for psB,L. Substituting these values into equation (23) gives:  
 
(24) ( ) (1 2 (1 ))
DM S E
VH L B L E p pp qz δ Π= + −− +  
 
Substituting out for pL and pB means that equation (24) can be also expressed as:   
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  It is straightforward to show that when the elected official adopts a mixed strategy 
that includes pandering, the expected pay-off to the voter is less than with the 
decentralised regional administration. That is to say, in this case adding a democratic 
element reduces the expected pay-off to the voter. Combining equations (12), (15) and 
(24), produces: 
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which is true by construction. 
 
 The intuition behind this result is that in the mixed strategy equilibrium, voting 
generates no improvement in the expected quality of the period-2 official. The mixed 
strategy of a low quality official in period 1 is calculated so that the voter is unable to 
distinguish, even probabilistically, between a high and low quality official. However, this 
means that in period 1, the low quality official has to disregard her B signal a certain 
proportion of the time. This is inefficient, as the signal is informative. With the regionally 
delegated outcome, the official always follows her signal, which is why such an 
institutional arrangement has a higher expected pay-off for the voter. 
 
For this set of prior probabilities, the outcome would be more efficient if the voter 
could commit to always re-electing the incumbent official. Then the official would 
always follow her signal in period 1, with no loss to the official’s expected quality in 
period 2. However, this outcome is not sub-game perfect and poses a moral hazard for the 
  21voter. If the official believes the voter and follows her signal, it is then in the voter’s 
interest to remove the official if she chooses a period-1 β policy. In essence, the 
decentralised regional solution of Section 5 makes such a promise credible by removing 
the electoral process.  
 
 
7.  The optimal organisational mechanism for delivering local public goods 
 
For the present model, we are now in a position to determine the most efficient 
organisational form for administering the delivery of local public goods. This is shown 
schematically in Table 7.1. We start by comparing the devolved and decentralised 
systems. From the discussion in Section 6, we know that the relative efficiency of these 
two systems depends solely on the nature of the equilibrium reached in the devolved 
case, which itself rests only on the value of the composite parameter k. More specifically, 
where the devolved equilibrium involves potential pandering, the decentralised (regional) 
system outperforms the devolved system. This occurs for negative values of the 
parameter k. However, if the devolved equilibrium is non-pandering, so that the official 
always follows her signal, the devolved outcome is relatively more efficient. This is the 
case where the value of k is positive.  
 
Table 7.1: The most efficient organisational structure for the delivery of local public 
goods 
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  22Notes to Table 7.1 :  
k is the composite variable defined in equation (19). It is a function of parameters pA, 
qL and δ. E (Π
N
V) is the expected pay-off to the citizen (voter) where the provision of 
local public goods is determined at the national level. It is defined in equation (11) and is 
a function of parameters pA and n. 
E (Π
R
V) is the expected pay-off to the citizen where the provision of local public 
goods is determined at the regional level. It is defined in equation (15) as function of 




F  is the expected pay-off to the voter (citizen) where the provision of local 
public goods is determined through a non-pandering devolved mechanism. It is defined in 
equation (20) as function of parameters pA, pH, qL and δ. 
 
The most straightforward cases are where the value of k is negative. Here the 
regional organisation always dominates the devolved. Therefore the nature of the most 
efficient delivery of local public goods depends solely on whether the expected pay-off 
under the national administrative structure is greater or less than under the regional 
administrative arrangements. This gives the corresponding entries in the second column 
in Table 7.1. 
 
However, where k is positive, the devolved (non-pandering) organisational 
structure dominates the regional one. This means that where the expected pay-off under 
the regional organisational structure is greater than under the national, the devolved 
organisational structure will be the most efficient. This determines the entry in the second 
row of the first column. However, where the national outcome has a higher expected 
value than the regional and the value of k is positive, the most efficient organisational 
structure might be devolved or national. 
 
We wish to focus more clearly on these results by mapping the most efficient 
administrative arrangement to key parameter values. In particular, for a set of specific 
values for n, pA and δ we show how the optimal administrative organisation depends on 
the prior probabilities, pH and qL, that is, the parameters that determine the expected 
  23efficiency of the official. The values chosen for n and pA are 5 and 0.5 respectively and 
we show the results for values of δ equal to 0.3 and 0.6. 
 
We begin by delineating the parameter values which separate pandering from 
non-pandering strategies for devolved governance. As argued in Section 6, expression 
(19) determines whether the devolved equilibrium involves pandering or not. We use this 
expression to generate the locus of values for δ and qL that produce a value for k equal to 
zero for various values of pA. These are presented in Figure 7.1. They mark the boundary 
values between those parameter combinations to the left that produce non-pandering 
outcomes and those to the right that produce pandering outcomes. Note that the critical 
values of qL are not very sensitive to changes in the value of pA. The value of the critical 
value of qL increases with the discount factor δ. For our illustrative values of 0.3 and 0.6 
for δ and a value of pA of 0.5, the corresponding critical values of qL are 0.6 and 0.75 
respectively. 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the optimal administrative mechanism associated with 
alternative combinations of the parameters pH and qL. In this diagram we illustrate the 
boundary relationships identified in Table 7.1. The parameter values that mark the 
boundary between where the national and the decentralised organisations are optimal are 
found in the following way. Substituting n = 5 and pA = 0.5 into equation (5), the 
expected pay-off for the citizen under national decision taking, E(Π
N
V), is 0.6875. 
Similarly, substituting pA = 0.5 into equation (15), gives the expected pay-off for the 
citizen under a decentralised set-up, E(Π
R
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Equation (28) can be rearranged and expressed as: 
 














and is represented by the line XYZ in Figure 7.2. Points to the left of this boundary are 
where the national organisation is preferred to the regional: points to the right of line 
XYZ are where the reverse is true. 
 
The boundary parameter values between the regional and devolved 
administrations is given by the two vertical lines at values of qL equal to 0.75 and 0.6 
which correspond to the values for δ of 0.3 and 0.6. Points to the right of these lines are 
points where, for these parameter values for n and pA and the appropriate value of δ, the 
devolved institutional arrangement dominates the decentralised regional one. For points 
to the left of these lines the opposite holds.  
 
Based on the classification in Table 7.1, where δ = 0.6, parameter combinations in 
the following sectors are associated with the three separate organisational forms: 
devolved, A; regional (decentralised), B and D; and national, C and E. In this case there 
are no parameter combinations that fall within the ambiguous sector. With a lower 
discount factor, δ = 0.3, the same procedure produces: devolved, A and B; regional 
(decentralised), D; national E; and F is the ambiguous sector where national or devolved 
might be the optimal arrangement. Note than when the discount factor is reduced, so that 
benefits and costs in the future take a lower weight, the benefit from pandering is reduced 
and the range of parameter values concerning the official’s quality over which devolved 
arrangements are optimal is increased.  
 
8.  Comment and conclusions 
 
Across different countries there is a wide range of decentralised and devolved 
arrangements for the delivery of local public goods. The present paper shows that in a 
very specific model, the optimal organisational arrangements depend on the degree of 
economic variation between regions, the difference in quality between the regional and 
  25national officials and the time discount factor employed by regional officials. Variations 
in these parameters will produce variation in the most efficient organisational form. We 
are well aware that considerations other than simple efficiency can dominate decisions 
over the appropriate system of local democracy. However, we simply note that such 
decisions are likely to have efficiency implications. 
 
We have used a very stripped down model of pandering. This has been to show 
that even where there is no variation within the electorate and elected officials have 
interests that are almost aligned with those of the voter, that there can be costs moving 
from a decentralised to a devolved administrative arrangement. However, if the 
assumptions underpinning this model are relaxed, then problems of pandering remain and 
others emerge. For example, if the voter has more information, so that there is a 
probability that he can verify whether the policy in any one period is correct, then 
pandering is reduced. However, if the official gains utility from simply being in office, 
the incentive to pander increases. Further, where we allow for intra-regional variation 
between voters there are other inefficiencies that might be associated with local 
representative democracy; local log-rolling might lead to excess public expenditure and 
the tyranny of the (local) majority. 
  
The model is also extremely sparse in its representation of the regional system. 
In particular, we allow for no systematic economic differences across regions. Each 
region is subject to the same probability of being in one of two situations (states). Further 
these states are not serially correlated. However, in reality regions are likely to differ, 
both in terms of the variability of the shocks to which they are subject, and also in terms 
of differences that persist over time. Where this is the case, efficiency might be 
maximised where different groups of regions are subject to different devolved or 
decentralised arrangements. A symmetric organisational structure might be sub-optimal 
from a pure efficiency standpoint.    
 
 
  26For the UK government, local democratic control has often been identified as a 
key component of the “New Localism” agenda. However, local electorates have been 
much more sceptical.
8 In so far as the present paper has practical implications, this is that 
efficiency considerations do not automatically favour devolution and greater electoral 
powers at the local level. Further, we are arguing that whilst an asymmetric 
decentralised/devolved system, whilst administratively untidy might be economically 
efficient.  
                                                           
8 Whilst the vote for the Scottish Parliament was unambiguously in favour, that for the Welsh Assembly 
was marginal, the Regional Assembly for the Northern Region was rejected and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly is currently in abeyance. 
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  29Appendix 1: Recent changes in decentralised and devolved governance in the UK 
 
Although often characterised as a centralised state with a strong parliament and a 
strong national party political system, decentralisation within the United Kingdom was 
already well established prior to the election of the Labour government in 1997. From the 
Home Rulers of the late nineteenth century, the plans for devolution to Ireland (and the 
existence of a separate parliament in Stormont until 1972) and the creation of the 
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish offices the United Kingdom has extensive experience 
of decentralising government. The change from decentralisation to devolution came in 
1997 with the election of Labour government with a specific manifesto pledge to create 
legislative bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and regional assemblies in 
England. The establishment of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly and the 
granting of full devolved powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1999 created a 
system of asymmetric devolution to replace the asymmetric system of decentralisation. 
Mitchell (2006) has termed the relationships between dominant England and the other 
parts of the United Kingdom as a ‘state of unions’, the transformation in 1999 was from 
decentralised control to devolved legitimacy. 
 
The UK Parliament at Westminster retains control over policies with significant 
spatial spillovers, such as defence and income redistribution (social security transfers, 
pensions etc.) for all parts of the UK. However responsibility for a range of other policies 
– for example health, education and industrial development – has been devolved to the 
territorial legislatures, but with differing degrees of legislative powers and competency. 
The funding arrangements are nominally unchanged.
9 Given that the administrative 
mechanisms of government were already in place in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and 
Wales, the key difference is that relevant policy decisions previously taken at 
Westminster and implemented through the secretaries of state, are now made by the 
territorial legislatures and delivered by the territorial executive. The crucial difference is 
                                                           
9 The Barnett formula that had been used to calculate pre-devolution Scottish Office spending was retained 
to determine the devolved budget of the Scottish Parliament, though the actual implications of devolution 
for the funding of the public sector in Scotland is contested (Christie and Swales, 2005, Midwinter, 2004).    
  30that what were, for Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales previously primarily 
administrative decisions - taken at a distance – are now political decision taken locally. 
 
Perhaps the most innovative constitutional development has been the 
development of plans for regional government in England. This has meant movement to a 
decentralised, delegated model with Regional Development Agencies, Regional 
Government Offices and Regional Chambers - typically in conjunction with a myriad of 
other local agencies - implementing policy. It was the government’s plan (vision even) 
that these regional institutions would be under the control of regional elected assemblies. 
But this idea has proved unpopular and is unlikely to be implemented in the foreseeable 
future. The North East – the region thought most in favour - decisively rejected an elected 
assembly in a referendum in 2004 and plans for other referenda across England have been 
abandoned. Only in London, where the Greater London Authority of a mayor and elected 
assembly oversees co-ordination for services with large spillovers between the London 
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Appendix 2: Implications of assumptions concerning low quality officials 
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Using (A2.2) and the fact that both the probabilities of the regional types and of their 
signals are both comprehensive: 
   
(A2.3) 1 1 BA B psp s pp = −≥ = −  
 
Rearranging (A2.3) gives: 
 
(A2.4)  A A psp ≤    
 





The probability that the official is of low quality, given that her signal is B, can be 
calculated from Bayes’ theorem: 












Substituting the values of psB.L and psB given by equations (1) and (A2.2) into equation 
(A2.5), and noting that given that  (1 ) 1 LL L qp q + −≤ produces: 
  











Using (A2.6) and the fact that both the unconditional and conditional probabilities of the 
official’s type are comprehensive gives: 
 
 (A2.7)  ,, 11 LB HB L H pop o p p = −≥ = −  
 
Rearranging expression (A2.7) produces 
 
(A2.8)  , H BH pop ≤  
 




The probability that the official is of low quality, given that her signal is A, can be 




























= ⎢⎥ − ⎣⎦
 
 
Given the restrictions on the probabilities of signal types: 
 
(A2.11)  ,, 11 LL A B B L BB , L p po iff ps ps iff ps ps ≥− ≥ − → ≤ ,  
 
Using equation (A2.1) and equation (1) in the text and given that the probabilities on the 
official’s quality are comprehensive: 
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With the parameter restrictions: 
 
(A2.13)    1 (1 ) 0 LL L pq p ≥− + ≥
 
This implies that, from (A2.12) and (A2.11): 
 
(A2.14)  ,, BB L LL psp s pp o ≤ →≥   
 
Using (A2.14) and the fact that both the unconditional and conditional probabilities of the 
official’s type are comprehensive gives: 
 
(A2.15)  ,, 11 LH L A H A p pp o p o = −≥ = −  
 
Rearranging expression (A2.15) generates the inequality: 
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(A2.16)  , H AH pop ≥  
 




From the fact that the conditional probabilities are comprehensive; 
 
(A2.17)  ,, 1 H AL A pop o = −  
 
Using equation (A2.2), (A2.10) and equation (1) in the text: 
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Substituting equation (A2.18) into (A2.17) and rearranging gives: 
 
(A2.19) ,
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  We tackle the devolved non-pandering equilibrium in three steps. First, we show 
that given the voter’s strategy, there is a range of parameters (prior probabilities) for 
which the official’s non-pandering strategy maximises her pay off. Second, we 
demonstrate that if the official adopts this strategy, Bayesian updating of the initial priors 
supports the voter’s beliefs. Finally, we confirm that given the voter’s beliefs, the voter’s 
strategy maximises his pay off. 
 
  The first step of the strategy is shown in detail in the text and the parameter 
constraint is shown in expression (19). The second step is to verify the rationality of the 
voter’s beliefs. From expressions (5) and (6) we know that the probability that an official 
is of low quality conditional on her receiving a B signal is greater than the prior 
probability of low quality, and that the reverse is the case for an official receiving an A 
signal. Therefore where the official, independent of her quality, adopts a strategy of 
always following her signal in period 1, the voter’s expectations are verified.   
 
  Step three is to show that the voter’s strategy is optimal given his expectations. 
This implies that the voter’s expected period-2 pay-off from removing a non-pandering 
incumbent who adopts policy β in period 1,  , (2 )
DF
VR M E β Π  must be greater than the voter’s 
expected period-2 pay-off from retaining her,  , (2 )
DF
VR T E β Π , so that: 
 
(A3.1)  ,, (2 ) (2 )
DF DF
VR M VR T EE β β Π≥ Π . 
 
The values for the expected pay-offs are given by: 
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Using equations (A3.2) and (A3.3), and recognising the restrictions placed on parameter 
values, produces: 
 
(A3.4)    ,, , (2 ) (2 )
DF DF
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However, again from expression (6), we know that inequality (A3.4) is satisfied where 
the official follows a non-pandering strategy. Using a similar argument, 
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We begin again with the official’s decision. In period 2, both high and low quality 
officials always follow their signal. Further, if she is of high quality, or if the signal is A, 
the official will always follow her signal in period 1, independently of the voter’s 
strategy. Our concern is therefore only with the period-1 decision of the low-quality 
official. 
 
  Where the low quality official receives a period-1 B signal, the expected values 
for following the signal or pandering are given by equations (A3.6) and (A3.7):  
    
(A3.6)    ,, ()
DF
OL B L R T L Eq p v β δ Π= +
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Using equations (A3.6) and (A3.7), the condition under which the official is indifferent 











Δ= − =  
   
where the M superscript indicates that this is the value for a mixed strategy equilibrium 
and pvRT,χ is the probability of retaining an official adopting an χ period-1 policy, χ = α 
or β. Given the restrictions placed on parameter values and the fact that inequality (19) in 
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He plays a pure strategy when the official chooses policy α: he always retains the 
incumbent official. However, when the policy choice is β, the voter plays a mixed 








− . Therefore expressions 
(A.3.8) and (A3.9) imply that the low quality official’s mixed strategy on receiving a 
period-1 B signal is optimal, given the voter’s mixed strategy when the official adopts a 
period-1 β strategy. 
 
The next step is to show that the voter’s expectations are consistent with Bayesian 
updating of the priors, given the official’s strategy. Using Bayes theorem: 














poβ,L reflects the mixed strategy of the low quality official and, using equation (1) in the 
text, is given as: 
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Further, using equation (A3.11): 
 
(A3.12)  , () H BL LB HL B p pp pp o p p p p ββ =+ = + =  
 
Substituting equations (A3.11 and (A3,12) into (A3.10) gives: 
 
(A3.13)  , LL pop β =  
  
This is therefore consistent with one element of the voter’s beliefs. 
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  39so that: 
 
(A3.16)  , () H AL L A HL A p pp pp o p p p p αα =+ = + =  
 
Substituting equations (A3.15) and (A3.16) into equation (A3.14) produces: 
 
(A3.17)  , LL pop α =  
  
Therefore both elements of the voter’s beliefs are consistent with Bayesian updating, 
given the official’s strategy. 
 
The final step is to show that the voter’s strategy is optimal, given his beliefs. The 
expected value in period 2 of removing the incumbent official is always z. The expected 
value for retaining an incumbent adopting policy χ is given as: 
 
(A3.18)  ,, , (2 ) ,
D
VR T H H L L Ep z p z χχ χ χ αβ Π=+ =  
 
Therefore, using equation (15) in the text, which defines the parameter z: 
 
(A3.19)  ,, , , (2 ) (2 ) ( ) ( ) ,
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Given that both sets of probabilities sum to unity, equation (A3.19) can be re-expressed 
as: 
 
(A3.20)  ,, , (2 ) (2 ) ( ) ( ) ,
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Given that 1 ≥ qL ≥ 0, from equations (12) and (13) in the text:  
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This implies that if an official adopts policy χ in period 1, it is rational for the voter to 
retain the official if pL ≥ p L,χ and mix his strategy between retaining and retaining the 
official where pL = pL,χ. Therefore given the voter’s expectations concerning pL,α and pL,β, 
it is rational for the voter to retain all officials who choose a period-1 α strategy and to 
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  In calculating E(Π
D
V)
F, we require values of poL,A  poH,A  psA and psA in terms of 
the prior probabilities pA, pH and qL. 
 
From equation (A2.18): 
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From equation (A2.19): 
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From equation (A2.2): 
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From equation (A2.3) 
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